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Abstract
We examine competition in Mobile Internet services, when operators bargain over the coverage sharing
and their reciprocal roaming charge. Results show that in equilibrium operators cover the overall territory
entirely and no-duplication is chosen, no matter how their bargaining power is distributed: operators
have aligned incentives to enjoy roaming revenues extra-rents. Only their relative stand-alone coverage
and, therefore, their appropriation of these rents, can be aﬀected by how bargaining power is distributed.
We ﬁnally discuss the scope for regulatory intervention to reduce these rents in the forms of minimum
coverage requirements, or control over the level of reciprocal roaming charges.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most of the literature on telecommunications has focused on the role of interconnection charges in deter-
mining the possible outcomes of competition between interconnected networks and, consequently, the type
of regulation that they may call for. For a general understanding of the standard interconnection issues
see, for example, Laﬀont-Tirole (2000), or Armstrong (2002). Focussing on interconnected - and, therefore,
bilateral - services, most of these studies neglect another interesting aspect characterizing in particular the
Internet Industries: users value the access per se to unilateral ﬂow of information services more than the
interconnection to other users when making use of these services.
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1When focusing the attention on unilateral services such as the downloading, or the uploading of ﬂow of
information and/or applications, diﬀerent issues may arise that involve the pure access to these services. In
this direction, the seminal paper of Laﬀont-Marcus-Rey-Tirole (2003) - hereafter LMRT - represents one of
the ﬁrst attempts to explicitly consider unilateral services even though in the wired Internet environment.
In LMRT a model of competition between interconnected Internet Service Providers (ISPs) is considered.
When a subscriber to an ISP wants to access a web page that only the other ISP can give access to - because
the creators of this web page have asked to appear on that platform instead of another - there may be scope
for ﬁxing an interconnection charge between rival ISPs to access each other’s web pages. This gives rise
to what it is labeled as a hot-potatoes behavior: ISPs may otherwise (i.e. in the absence of an appropriate
interconnection charge to be paid in exchange) have incentives to beneﬁt from rival networks serving their
own subscribers as the demand for access may come from one network and be served by the other.1 If this
model gives interesting insights in terms of how to price interconnection processes in order to account for
this type of behavior, it still cannot explain other types of behavior which are typically related to unilateral
services provided through the wireless Internet instead. As a result, for example questions related to the
decisions over the extent of the coverage to be oﬀered to subscribers, the level of the roaming charge for
allowing for the cross-access, and the subsequent pricing for services to users are left unexplored.
Our work focuses on these alternative questions that arise when considering another type of network
services, namely the wireless Internet, as opposed to the wired Internet, ones. Wireless Internet services
present special features as compared to the wired Internet ones. Even though the wireless Internet services
have in common with the wired Internet ones the possibility to give access to unilateral ﬂo w so fc o n t e n t s( f o r
downloading of contents from the content providers to the users via the network operator connecting them;
or from the users to the content providers for uploading of contents, via the connection given to them by
the network operators), and they share among them the issue of possible compatibility2 between networks
1In LMRT an elaborate example is made to justify the argument. To restate it, suppose that consumers being connected
in a European country want to access a Chinese web page. Unless a multi-homing is chosen by this Chinese web page, what
happens in reality is that their demand is somehow transferred to the Chinese ISP which hosts the required web page and the
downloading cost is incurred by this ISP instead of by the one from where the demand itself originated. Then the European
ISP only pays the cost associated with originating the demand, and the rest is faced by the Chinese ISP. Actually, in LMRT the
ISPs have to be intended as backbones, being connected through each other all over the world. In their work, this hot-potatoes
behavior may lead to the application of an oﬀ-net cost pricing principle in order to ﬁx the level of the possible interconnection
to be paid between rival ISPs.
2For a review on compatibility and standardization issues see Church-Gandal (2004), or Farrell-Klemperer (2004).
2through the compatibility/standardization of several contents to be accessible to subscribers of either network
for example, they do diﬀer in the mobility of their respective usage. Mobility oﬀers wireless Internet networks
an option to decide over other elements which cannot be present when dealing with standard interconnection
or with wired Internet: coverage of the territory and its possible sharing through agreements which may also
concern then the roaming charges operators may have to pay to each other to let their respective subscribers
access services in a territory covered by the rival. The accessibility in diﬀerent territories of services and
their associated roaming access possibilities make the diﬀerence between these two environments and create
an interest to study further the implications of possible sharing agreements between network operators, of
their impact in terms of social welfare, and, therefore, of whether this may constitute a scope for regulatory
intervention, and, if so, of which nature. Roaming agreements exist and are already in place, for example
in the wireless telephony. However, in this case the roaming allows one user to interconnect to another
one, by accessing a rival network to the one this user has initially subscribed to, any time a call needs to
be initiated on a territory not covered by his fellow network. In this paper, we instead study the private
incentives to agree over a possible sharing of the coverage and the level of the reciprocal roaming charges
for network operators when having to provide access to services which are at once mobile and unilateral by
nature. This way, we expect to be able to draw conclusions upon which is going to be the degree of coverage
of the territory,w h i c hf o r mroaming agreements may take and which role they may play, which ﬁnal tariﬀs
are going to prevail for end users, and whether there exists scope for regulation.I n o t h e r t e r m s :w h i c h
is the operators’ interest? Can we rely on a ’cooperation’ between competitors, i.e. should infrastructure
sharing be refused, accepted, or even encouraged? These questions have been and are still heavily debated
in particular in the context of the third generation of mobile communications, in connections with the high
prices of the licenses in some countries and the higher than expected cost of this technology, which have
led operators to contemplate more eagerly sharing possibilities - not to mention the environmental concerns
triggered by the multiplicity of antennas that may be brought about by the implementation of this new
technology.
To this purpose, a model is developed where competing networks have to decide whether to agree on
providing cross-access, and at which cost to do so (i.e. which level of the roaming charge will be ﬁxed), thanks
3to the adoption of, for example, UMTS technology, or Wi-Fi hotspots3, that allows them to serve subscribers
of either networks as long as they are present in the territory users may move to. We do so in what we
label as an open system, as opposed to the closed system we analyze in a companion paper, Fabrizi-Wertlen
(2003). Open system stands for the possibility of providing access to the mentioned unilateral services to
a user by letting him connect to either networks depending on which territory he wants to use the service,
either in the territory covered by his chosen network or the one of the rival network. In our companion
paper, a closed system is envisaged instead where users can only access the services oﬀered by their chosen
network, but not those of the other one. In this environment, network operators have to decide whether to
continue oﬀering a lower quality service (e.g. the 2G, second generation, Mobile Internet one) or to upgrade
their services (e.g. oﬀering the 3G, third generation, Mobile Internet ones). In a model of horizontal and
vertical diﬀerentiation where users may be heterogeneous with respect to their taste for upgraded services we
are able to characterize the type of equilibria that may arise in the adoption of Mobile Internet technologies.
In that model, the users’ subscription choice determines whether they will be able to access low or high
quality services depending on whether their chosen network provides either the ﬁrst or the second type of
services. However, if quality issues matter in that paper they are going to be irrelevant in this new open
system context considered in the present work. Given that here each user can access any content either
way, and that we assume that networks cannot distort the quality of the access depending on whether it is
required by a network’s fellow or not, the perceived quality of this access by users is not going to depend
on the degree of coverage chosen by the network they belong to, as opposed to that of the other one. Users
only care about the extent of the overall coverage of the market to which they may have access to instead.
This is a reasonable assumption to be made as long as roaming agreements are feasible by technology. If
users can access contents, or applications, which do not have a format that is network-speciﬁc, meaning
that they have a portable format accessible through either network, there is no reason to assume that users
perceive a diﬀerent quality of the Mobile Internet services depending on whether they get them accessing
their chosen network or the rival one. If instead the content to be accessed would be network-speciﬁca n d ,
3Wi-Fi, or Wireless Fidelity, allows connection to the Internet using a wireless technology. Wi-Fi enabled computers can
send and receive data indoors and outdoors; anywhere within the range of a base station.
This technology, which exploits a particular radio mobile frequency diﬀerent from the UMTS one, therefore may enable an
alternative wireless connection to the Internet or the Intranet in urban areas.
4eventually, network-adaptable at an additional cost, then we would have to consider some type of quality
issues that could arise as a consequence. In that case a modeling of the cost of adaptability and also of the
role of content providers/developers would be needed to complement the analysis. As we will discuss in the
conclusion to this work, these considerations are left for further research.4 I nt h ep r e s e n tw o r k ,w er u l eo u t
quality issues. Doing so, we implicitly assume to be in a mature phase of adaptability or standardization of
the Mobile Internet services that makes them be accessible from diﬀerent devices/networks that are sharing
a common protocol for data transfer. For this reason we assume that the real cost of providing access is the
same no matter whether this access is required by a fellow or a non-fellow user.
By allowing for cross-access, we also allow for operators to agree on whether to share the associated cost of
creating this access (e.g. the cost of putting additional antennas on the territory for data transmission which
uses a larger bandwidth capacity).5 Therefore, the cost of access may be interpreted as per-access cost of
building the necessary infrastructure for transmitting data, which can be calculated as the value of the long-
run-incremental-cost6 associated with the infrastructure needed to provide access to this type of services in
a given area. Mobile Internet services are carried out using the Internet Protocol (data transmission) whose
cost only depends on installed capacity (large bandwidth) and no longer on the real time of connection
and transfer of data per se. Because of these characteristics, we abandon the standard usage-based pricing
a n df o c u si n s t e a do na naccess fee subscribers pay to their chosen network that is usage-independent.T h e
consequence is that, if users of say network 1 need to access services when moving in an area where only
network 2 is present, network 2 will receive from network 1 a roaming charge for the provision of this access,
but each network charges a subscription fee to its fellow users for their potential access to services using
either networks. Therefore, if networks agree over the sharing of the coverage and upon their reciprocal
roaming charges, the cost associated with a particular user’s access may be met either by the network this
consumer belongs to, or by the rival one, depending on which one of the two is present in an area where the
user asks for this access. Once this special feature has been recognized, it becomes clear that letting the rival
operator be present alone in an area means letting the rival alone pay for the access it provides while having
4For an analysis of quality issues in the wireless telephony environment see, for example, Cambini-Valletti (2005).
5In our companion paper, we have interpreted this cost as linked to the constant cost that application service providers
(ASPs) incur to transmit the services to the operators. It could also have been interpreted as the cost of providing access itself.
6These costs are the ones that correspond to the conﬁguration of the network itself, its maintainance, and also the ones
associated with innovations that may improve the provision of services themselves.
5to repay him the roaming charge for the access (eventually) provided to users subscribed to the network not
present in that area. This feature is somehow similar to the hot-potatoes behavior described above: in the
presence of an agreement over the roaming charge to be paid for that access, networks may prefer to let the
other one serve their own subscribers to the situation where both of them would be present instead. This is
so, as we will see, as long as there exists a scope for the appropriation of rents that may come from roaming
agreements.
Results of the model will show how Mobile Internet networks always agree to cover the entire territory
and not to overlap each other’s territory, when they are free to bargain over the degree of coverage of the
territory and their reciprocal roaming charge. No matter how the bargaining power is distributed between
them, operators have aligned incentives to enjoy extra-rents coming from the roaming revenues. Only their
relative stand-alone coverage and, therefore, their degree of appropriation of these rents, will be aﬀected by
the distribution of the bargaining power. Therefore, the no-duplication behavior is a way of guaranteeing
them to exploit these rents, which would vanish if overlaps of the covered territory were to be observed.
The scope for rents come from the fact that operators are aligned in their desire to inﬂate their reciprocal
roaming charge in order to extract the mentioned rents from users willing to use their proposed services
in either territory, whether they would provide them access directly or not. Inﬂated roaming charges as
compared to their real associated costs, as well as inﬂated subscription fees, will be the consequence of this
behavior: ﬁnal users bear the cost of the operators’ choices of no-duplication of coverage of the territory and,
therefore, of inﬂated roaming charges. The work suggests for regulatory interventions in order to reduce the
scope for the appropriation of these extra-rents. One possibility that will be discussed consists in ﬁxing a
minimum coverage requirement for each Mobile Internet operator in order to induce a potential overlap that
would not be observed in equilibrium otherwise if operators were free to bargain upon both their respective
coverage and their reciprocal roaming charge. Alternatively, a control over the setting of the roaming charge
and/or its level may help mitigate the need to intervene without the inconvenience of inducing undesirable
duplication of infrastructure over the territory (e.g. in order to reduce the presence of multiple antennas in a
given territory). Depending on which are the objectives pursued by the regulator, one or the other practice,
or a combination of both, may be recommendable.
6The work is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, the users’ subscription decisions, the
determination of the subscription fees by operators, and the sharing agreement between network operators
in terms of coverage and roaming charge. Section 3 discusses the impact on social welfare of this unregulated
environment for the coverage of the territory and the level of the roaming charge and suggests for possible




In this section, we provide a description of the links that cross-access makes possible as well as provide an
initial explanation of how access and roaming may be introduced into a formal model. Doing so, we also
introduce the notation used throughout the paper.
Fig. 1 represents the type of links and access that are feasible when cross-access is made possible.






Figure 1: Open system
Users are uniformly distributed along a unit line and choose which Mobile Internet operator to be sub-
scribed to. There are two horizontally diﬀerentiated Mobile Internet operators labeled MOi,w i t hi =1 ,2.
Operators charge a subscription fee pi to their subscribers for accessing Mobile Internet services. Creating
this access is associated with a cost, c, which is assumed to be equal for both operators. Operators 1 and
2 have respectively a share α and 1 − α of subscribers. As discussed in the introduction, opposite to the
7situation in Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003), when sharing agreements are possible, subscribers of network i can not
only access their own network, but also the other one any time they are asking for access in an area not
covered by their chosen network. For this access, a reciprocal roaming charge, r, has to be paid between the
network the subscriber belongs to and the network that actually gives access to these subscribers.
We denote the overall available territory by T and we normalize it to one. Each MOi will choose which
part to cover within this available territory, so that the chosen territory by each operator, Ti, will satisfy
Ti ≤ T ≡ 1. Depending on which part of the territory has been chosen by each operator, there may exist
an overlap between territories, β, which represents the part of the territory that would be served by both
operators at once. This part of territory will not let any cross-payment for roaming arise, since by default
each operator would provide access directly to his own subscribers. The roaming charge will have to be paid
only in the event that a subscriber of, say, MOi uses the access of MOj,w i t hi 6= j. Therefore, this can only
happen for what we label as stand-alone coverage of MOj, denoted γj = Tj − β, which corresponds to the
part of the chosen territory where operator j is alone. Having normalized the maximum available territory
to one, we can interpret the overall extent of territory and the stand-alone coverage chosen by each operator
as its relative portions. The need to virtually distinguish between overall chosen territory to be covered
by each (Ti) and stand-alone coverage (γi) depends on the need to separate the part of the coverage that
would create possible subscription revenues alone, from the one that will give rise to roaming net revenues
also. The overall available territory ﬁxes an implicit constraint on the choices networks might make, i.e.
γ1 + γ2 + β ≤ T, which tells us that the sum of each stand-alone coverage, and possible overlap, can never
exceed the total available territory.
2.2 Timing
The steps of the game are as follows:
1. Mobile operators bargain over their coverage sharing, Ti and, therefore, γi, and their reciprocal
roaming access charge, r;
2. subscription fees7, pi,a r es e t ;
7Remember that as in our companion paper, Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003), we concentrate here on usage-independent pricing.
This is because we are considering here as well asymmetric services that can be provided through the Internet Protocol (data
transmission) whose cost may only depend on installed capacity (large bandwidth) which does not depend then on the usage
of the services.
83. users decide which network to be subscribed to;
4. Mobile Internet operators provide access and proﬁts are realized.
Given this timing, in the following subsections, we will solve the model backwards.
2.3 Users’ subscription decision
Users have mass one, they are uniformly distributed along the unit line and they only value the availability of
access to the services. Their utility, which we deﬁne as θ8, is usage-independent and it is the same regardless
of which network users are actually connected to when requiring the access. This is possible because, once
subscribed to any of the two networks, users can have access to the required services either through their
own network or the rival one thanks to the roaming agreements operators may sign between them. However,
we assume that MOs are perceived as being horizontally diﬀerentiated à la Hotelling. MOs are located at
the extremes of the unit line and users have to decide to which network to be subscribed to knowing that
each time they choose a network that does not correspond to their ideal one, they incur a psychological cost,
t, that is proportional to how distant this network is from their ideal one.9
By equalizing the utility users may get when subscribing either to MO1 or MO2, we get the following
condition that determines the way users are split between the two networks:
θ − p1 − tα = θ − p2 − t(1 − α). (1)








where σ ≡ 1/2t and 4p = p1 − p2.
8This notation is used in order to create a parallel with that proposed in our companion paper, Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003),
where this parameter represented the quality level of services consumers may have access to when subscribing to a particular
network. In that work diﬀerent types of service quality were proposed depending on whether operators chose standard Mobile
Internet services or more technologically sophisticated ones. In the present work, instead, the utility of having potential access
to the services, as already discussed in the introduction, is taken as being the same all over the two networks thanks to the
open system environment that allows the users to access services using either of the two networks available. Keeping a similar
notation between the two works will help us compare results obtained here with the ones obtained under the closed system
environment.
9We assume competition à la Hotelling in order to account for users to choose (subscribe to) either one or the other network;
in addition, Hotelling diﬀerentiation creates a parallel in this analysis to the one provided in Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003) where
results are expressed as function of the transportation costs as well. However, in the rest of the analysis it will become clear
that the diﬀerentiation of operators is not the responsible for the main results we will obtain in this paper. We could ﬁxt h e
transportation cost, t, to t =0and results, as well as policy recommendations, would remain the same.
9As already discussed, the users’ subscription decision is unaﬀected by the relative degree of sharing of the
territory by operators. All matters for them is the access to services using either one or the other network
and, therefore, the corresponding subscription fees to be paid for their potential access. This is guaranteed
to be the case as long as the roaming agreement is enforced in equilibrium. As it will be the shown in the
subsection devoted to the sharing agreement and the setting of the roaming charge, operators do prefer to
give access to each other’s subscribers by paying a roaming charge in exchange, so that roaming agreements
are going to be enforced in equilibrium.
2.4 Setting of each Mobile Internet operators’ subscription fee
MOs have to determine the level of the subscription fee, pi, their subscribers will have to pay, the extent
of coverage over the territory (which will induce the level of possible overlaps and, therefore, of the extent
of the ﬁnal stand-alone coverage), Ti ≤ T =1with i =1 ,2,a n dt h eroaming charge, r,a s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h e
potential cross-access.
Given this, we can write, w.l.o.g., the proﬁt of operator 1 as follows:
π1 = α(γ1 + β)(p1 − c)+αγ2(p1 − r)+( 1− α)γ1 (r − c). (3)
This proﬁt consists of three diﬀerent parts: the ﬁrst is the one that derives from serving its own subscribers
within its own covered area T1 = γ1 + β; the second one is the diﬀerence between subscription revenue it
gets by its subscribers and the roaming charge it has to pay for letting them access the rival network any
time they move into the area γ2 served by the rival operator alone; ﬁnally, the last is the net revenue of
giving access to the rival’s subscribers whenever they move into an area γ1 that operator 1 serves alone.
Within the context of the Hotelling model we consider, it should be noted that in equilibrium the entire
market will necessarily be covered - each operator has an incentive to cover any part of it that is left
uncovered by the rival. In other terms, condition γ1 + γ2 + β =1always hold in equilibrium. Moreover,
the opportunity cost of attracting an additional subscriber is the same for both networks (even if they have
asymmetric coverage) and is equal to c +( γ1 + γ2)(r − c). This comes from the fact that stealing a user
away from the rival: (i) generates more access, the cost of which is c+γ2 (r − c); and (ii) reduces the access
revenue by γ1 (r − c). It can also be seen from the expression of the proﬁt above, which can be rewritten as
10π1 = α[p1 − (c +( γ1 + γ2)(r − c))] + γ1 (r − c), (4)
where the second term is not aﬀected by the pricing decisions.
Given this, the equilibrium prices are necessarily the same and the market shares are thus equal to 1/2;
together with the previous "full coverage" remark, it follows that the prices (subscription fees) are given by
the condition












Proposition 1 When sharing agreements are feasible, in equilibrium Mobile Internet operators have an
interest not to leave any part of the available territory uncovered so that condition γ1 +γ2 +β =1is always
fulﬁlled, i.e. an endogenous full coverage is always guaranteed.
2.5 Sharing agreement and setting of the reciprocal roaming charge
From equation (6) it can be noted that the proﬁt each operator can enjoy becomes, in the presence of a
possible roaming agreement, an increasing function of both the stand-alone coverage and the roaming charge
to be paid for providing access to non-fellow users needing it.
This tells us that each of these two operators would want to cover as much as possible of the available
territory alone, and to ﬁx the highest as possible roaming charge compatible with users to subscribe to either
one or the other network.
However, in the absence of an agreement between operators, none of them can guarantee that the ﬁnal
outcome of an uncoordinated decision on the degree of coverage by each would not correspond to a ﬁnal
possible overlap. This would not be strictly preferred by any of the two operators as any expansion of a
territory by one operator above the level that was guaranteeing no overlap will not increase the proﬁto ft h e
operator that chooses to do so, but instead decrease the proﬁt of the other one. For an illustration of the
argument see ﬁgure 2.
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T ‘1= γ 1+ β
Figure 2: Eﬀects of expanding the territory beyond γ1
To avoid such an indeterminacy of the ﬁnal outcome, operators may be pushed to agree on their respective
coverage ex-ante, i.e. at the same time as they agree to give access to each other networks thanks to the
setting of their reciprocal roaming charge. Diﬀerent scenarios can be envisaged about the way they may
reach such an agreement. However, one natural way to think about how the agreement can be reached is to
assume operators meet and bargain over their respective stand-alone coverage, while ﬁxing their reciprocal
roaming charge. Depending on the distribution of their respective bargaining power, a more or less symmetric
split of the overall territory can be therefore observed, but in any case the agreement is preferred to the
no-agreement situation. In that case, the proﬁt of each operator would correspond to the value each operator





This lower bound for the possible proﬁts to be obtained by each operator represents the threat point within
a Nash bargaining that operators may undertake when deciding upon their respective stand-alone coverage.
This means that even in the limit case, for which one of the two operators by not covering the territory
at all, would leave the other free to cover it entirely, this operator would not be worse oﬀ if compared with
the case in which it would have refused any potential agreement over the sharing of access.
Once it has been noted that each of the operators is at least as well oﬀ when accepting the sharing
agreement as if he was to refuse it, the distribution of the bargaining power will lead to a territory sharing,
which implies a speciﬁcw a yt h eo v e r a l li n d u s t r y ’ sp r o ﬁts are shared between these two operators.
10In our companion paper, Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003), operators facing a closed system were able to enjoy a proﬁt that corresponds
to the degenerate value of the proﬁts that can be enjoyed when the system is open instead, i.e. the one for which γi =0 .
12Proposition 2 The sharing agreement is always stable: (i) the no-agreement outcome is never strictly
preferred by any of the Mobile Internet operators no matter the extent of his stand-alone coverage; (ii) the
division of the territory between the Mobile Internet operators corresponds to their relative bargaining power;
(iii) none of the Mobile Internet operators is strictly better oﬀ by deviating from this agreed division.
A scope for rent extraction exists only as long as the roaming charge is ﬁxed at a level above its associated
cost. Therefore, the decision to be taken, once we have discussed the scope for agreeing on sharing the
coverage, is the one concerning the setting of the level of the reciprocal roaming charge.
Operators are aligned in their interest to ﬁx the highest possible roaming charge, compatible with main-
taining the participation from the users’ side in their consumption of the Mobile Internet services. Therefore,
each operator solves for:
½
maxr (π∗
i)T ∗=1,β∗=0 = 1
4σ + γi (r − c)
s.t. θ − (p∗)T ∗=1,β∗=0 − t1
2 =0 , (8)
where the maximization of the proﬁt has to be made under the users’ participation constraint.
The solution to this problem shows that operators will agree on proposing the same level of roaming
charge corresponding to




As in Fabrizi-Wertlen (2003), we can determine a threshold for which providing shared access is proﬁtable
for both MOs if compared to a situation in which each has to guarantee it on its own. This is valid, as
long as users’ valuations are high enough, more formally, when θ> 3
4σ + c11. So, if user’s valuations for the
proposed access to the services were high enough, the roaming charge would be ﬁxed to a level higher than
the associated cost of providing access to these services itself.
As a consequence, for θ> 3










+ c =( p∗)closed−system . (10)
11This constraint comes from the industry budget constraint that has to be fullﬁlled as well, in order for each operator not
to make negative proﬁts.
13The results obtained can be summarized as follows: when operators are allowed to agree over the sharing
of the coverage and over their reciprocal roaming charge there exists a scope for extra-rents to be extracted
from users and to be shared between operators proportionally to their relative coverage.
Proposition 3 Within a sharing agreement, Mobile Internet operators always agree on ﬁxing a level of
their reciprocal roaming charge which is inﬂated with respect to its associated cost of providing access: Mobile
Internet operators extract extra-rents, coming from roaming revenues, from users via the setting of inﬂated
subscription fees.
3 Is there scope for regulatory intervention?
Given the results obtained, i.e. that operators would agree on sharing the territory to be covered and on
setting an inﬂated reciprocal roaming charge, and, therefore, an inﬂated subscription fee, some questions
may arise like ”why should a regulator leave operators free to decide upon the sharing of the coverage of
the territory”, ”why should a regulator leave operators free to negotiate their reciprocal roaming charge”, or
”why should the no-duplication of access infrastructure be desirable within this context”? Knowing that no
external intervention may lead to an outcome where users are worse oﬀ and MOs a r ea b l et oc a p t u r ea
bigger share of the possible users’ surplus, ”why should a regulator not intervene”?
In order to address these questions, we should discuss the real objective function of the regulator. If the
regulator maximizes the sum of the joint proﬁts of the industry and the users’ surplus such that both have
equal weights, then an intervention would be irrelevant, as the roaming simply creates a scope for transferring
rents from users to MOs. However, if a larger weight is put on the users’ surplus within the evaluation of
the social welfare, compared to the joint proﬁts of the industry, then imposing ex-ante ”network duplication
requirement” or a ”minimum coverage requirement” could be valuable rules to be applied by regulator when,
for example, releasing licenses to operators to provide Mobile Internet services12.
If a regulator cared more about users’ surplus than industry proﬁts, then imposing ex-ante a rule that
requires the ”complete overlapping”, which means ”obligation for each operator to cover the overall territory”,
12As an example, consider the case of Czech Republic where a requirement to cover 90% of Prague area by 2007 has been
required to operators having gotten the licenses to provide 3G Mobile Internet services. Covering Prague represents something
like covering 50% of the potential 3G service users. This type of requirement ﬁnds its rationale in the analysis provided in the
present work.
14or ﬁxing an ex-ante level for the roaming charge to be paid between operators, i.e. having a ”perfect control
over the level of the roaming charge”, would be useful in order to let the appropriability of extra-rents coming
from roaming vanish. This is because the control over the precise level of the roaming charge itself, whenever
it could be implemented perfectly, would be a good tool for the reduction of possible rents operators might
obtain otherwise by acting in a completely unregulated environment. Setting r = c, for example, using the
timing described in our model, at stage 0, when combined with the no-duplication recommendation (letting
operators free to agree over the sharing of the coverage), may lead to the same outcome obtained within a
closed system in terms of ﬁnal prices and proﬁts, thereby removing the incentives for operators to collude in
exploiting roaming rents.
Proposition 4 There exist ex-ante regulatory interventions that may reduce the appropriation of extra-rents
coming from roaming revenues by Mobile Internet operators: (i) ﬁxing a ’minimum coverage requirement’
higher than half of the available territory, an overlap of the territories covered by each Mobile Internet
operator would be induced; (ii) a control over the level of the reciprocal roaming charge would mitigate or
even let vanish the scope for appropriability of rents.
If the regulator wants instead to encourage the adoption of new technologies and let MOs have larger
proﬁts 13, then, probably, “no intervention” is the best rule to be followed. Moreover, we may think that no-
intervention implies no-duplication of the access infrastructure which in turn translates into ’less antennas’
on the overall territory. This is because, for example, the access to the Mobile Internet may need to be made
by the use of signals to be converted and carried out by physical antennas to be put on a given territory
or area to be served. For this reason, our cost c could be easily interpreted as the cost of building/putting
an antenna in a given territory to allow for potential access by users moving in that area. Given that,
no-intervention would most likely translate into ’less antennas’, which could be a good reason per se for a
regulator to prefer not to intervene, as intervening would induce a possible proliferation of antennas over the
territory instead.
Proposition 5 Imposing ex-ante a ’no-duplication requirement’ by regulation induces the appropriation of
13In order, for example, to let them cover extra sunk costs associated to the adoption of this new technology itself − that we
did not take into account explicitly in this model, like the cost of getting the necessary licence to provide these services at the
ﬁrst place.
15extra-rents coming from roaming revenues by Mobile Internet operators, but helps reducing the proliferation
of the infrastructure necessary to provide the Mobile Internet services.
If the regulator would care about both preserving the environment and users’ surplus, probably an ex-ante
recommendation in terms of ”no-duplication” could be the mandatory, to be accompanied with an ex-ante
c o n t r o lo ft h el e v e lo ft h eregulated roaming charge. This combination of the two tools to be implemented
whenever possible, seems to be a valid solution in order to meet at once all the mentioned regulatory goals.
4C o n c l u s i o n
The present analysis has provided an initial insight into the role coverage sharing agreements and the
setting of a reciprocal roaming charge may play in creating the scope for Mobile Internet operators to
appropriate extra-rents. Once operators are free to decide upon both how to share the coverage of a given
territory and their reciprocal roaming charge, their appropriation of extra-rents cannot be avoided. Our
analysis shows that in these circumstances, competing operators would collude and originate in equilibrium
situations characterized by comprehensively covered territory, a territory sharing, a higher ﬁnal subscription
fee charged to consumers than would be the case in the absence of sharing access agreements, and higher
operators’ proﬁts, or proﬁts at worse equal, to those attainable through refusing any roaming agreement.
The observation of this possible phenomenon may create the scope for regulatory intervention depending
on the objectives of the regulator, i.e. depending on whether these are concerned with boosting proﬁtability
for ﬁrms on new segments, maximizing users’ surplus, protecting the environment, or any combination of
these objectives.
It follows then, that the decision, authorities in diﬀerent countries have taken, to require a minimum
coverage by each operator when allocating the 3G radio mobile spectrum licenses, for example, could have
been the result of a precise policy more or less oriented toward the need to avoid operators appropriating
roaming extra-rents. However, if a no-duplication recommendation was followed instead, this could be the
result of a rational choice as well: it could be used to encourage the adoption of new technologies; or could
create the scope for leaving some rents to operators to let them recover the huge costs of obtaining licenses
in the ﬁrst place; or simply it could prevent the undesired proliferation of antennas all over the territory.
16It is also important here to address the reasons for considering a constant marginal cost of providing
access. The focus on such an assumed cost is quite realistic as, a priori, there are no economies of scale
in the provision of access itself linked to the chosen coverage by each operator. However, when explicitly
taking into account ﬁxed costs linked to the provision of the access itself, the model should be adapted
accordingly in order to characterize the impact that these costs may have on the incentives for operators to
induce equilibria similar to those described here. One more consideration on this point may be necessary.
A possible extension of the present work may allow for considering additional costs to the ones envisaged
here that are associated with the roaming possibilities we allow for. If roaming, or cross-access is feasible
only when contents to be accessed are made adaptable, i.e. somehow compatible and portable under diﬀerent
standards the networks may adopt, then providing/developing a given content, in a given format, following
given compatibility rules, may be costly as well. When such a scenario is allowed for, content providers may
play an active role in determining the shape the overall coverage agreements may take, as they may change the
relative advantage operators have in enjoying roaming revenues as compared to when they can do so without
having to incur any extra-costs for that. Remember that in our analysis the real cost of giving access to either
fellow users or non-fellow users is the same, and is equal to c. Introducing the cost of content developments
and, possibly, of some market power from the application content providers/developers could provide some
interesting insights in terms of the sharing agreements to be observed, the networks’ choices in terms of
compatibility standards and, therefore, the competition to be played among operators adopting diﬀering
standards, and, eventually, between contents providers/developers for example. This type of considerations
are left for further research.
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